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THE SKELETON IN THE HARD DRIVE: ENCRYPTION AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
David W. Opderbeck
Abstract
Courts are grappling with the question whether forced decryption of
computer files violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. This Article supplies the background necessary for courts
to address this question. It explains how full disk encryption works and
discusses the nature of encryption technology from a semantic and
information-theory perspective. It also compares how similar questions
have been addressed in other areas of the law that have dealt with
computer code as speech: the First Amendment and copyright law. This
Article argues that disclosure of a password or encryption key is not a
testimonial act and therefore is not privileged under the Fifth
Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
User-controlled encryption is cheap, easy, and ubiquitous. This is
good, because encryption provides invaluable benefits for commerce and
personal freedom. Without encryption, the Internet and other modern
communications networks would lose much of their valuable
functionality. But encryption is also a significant problem, because it
enables criminals to hide evidence.1 Contrary to television shows such as
“CSI” or “24,” forensic investigators cannot crack most off-the-shelf
encryption.2 Many criminals hide skeletons in their hard drives, protected
by encryption that can only be unlocked with a skeleton key they alone
hold.
Common user-controlled encryption tools are enabled using
passwords, biometric identifiers (such as fingerprints), and encryption
keys.3 Courts have just begun to grapple with the question whether the
Fifth Amendment protects against the compelled disclosure of these
items.4 Most courts so far have agreed that disclosure of a password or
decryption key is a testimonial act.5 However, with some notable
exceptions, most courts have also agreed that the “foregone conclusion”
doctrine can justify compelled disclosure.6
To address this question, courts must obtain a clear understanding of
how encryption works, and, in particular, must understand common
forms of “full disk encryption.” Courts should also consider the
philosophical or normative question of what encryption is and what it
does in relation to computer code. Only with this kind of background can
courts decide whether disclosure of a password or encryption key is
“testimony” or whether the foregone conclusion doctrine can apply.
This Article supplies that necessary background and argues that, under
a proper application of Fifth Amendment doctrine, compelled decryption
ordinarily is not a testimonial act and therefore is not privileged. Part I of
this Article supplies a background in encryption technology. Part II
summarizes recent Fifth Amendment cases concerning compelled
decryption. Part III looks at encryption and computer code from a
semiotics and information theory perspective and examines how
computer code is treated under First Amendment and copyright law for
1. For a discussion of some of these tensions, see David W. Opderbeck, Encryption Policy
and Law Enforcement in the Cloud, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1657, 1662–63 (2017).
2. See infra Section I.B.
3. See infra Section II.B.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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possible analogies to the Fifth Amendment context. Part IV presents this
Article’s doctrinal arguments under the Fifth Amendment.
I. UNDERSTANDING ENCRYPTION
A. Encryption Algorithms and Keys
Encryption is the application of an algorithm to readable information
(plaintext) to render the information unintelligible (ciphertext).7
Decryption is the application of a “key” derived from the encryption
algorithm to render the information intelligible once again.8
An ancient and simple encryption scheme, the “Caesar Cipher,”
demonstrates how this process works.9 The Caesar Cipher involves
shifting the letters of the alphabet a set number of positions.10 A “ROT13”
Caesar cipher, for example, rotates the English alphabet 13 places to the
right, making the encryption “key” 13.11 Thus, using the ROT13 cipher,
the text “cynl vg ntnva fnz” means “play it again sam” because the letter
“r” is 13 places in the alphabet from the letter “e,” and so on. This is an
example of “symmetric key” encryption, because the same key is used to
encrypt and decrypt the data.12 In asymmetric or “public key” encryption,
there are two related keys: a “public” key and a “private” key.13
The ROT13 cipher is simple to use because, with twenty-six letters in
the Latin alphabet, each letter is the inverse of the letter that is thirteen
places away. This simplicity also makes ROT13 easy to crack. 14 Many
contemporary forms of computer encryption, however, are essentially
impossible to crack, even with the help of large-scale computer power.
For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) approved by the
U.S. National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) for use with
top secret information, applies 128-bit encryption with 128, 192, or 256
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST Special
Publication 800-57, RECOMMENDATION FOR KEY MANAGEMENT – PART 1: GENERAL REVISION 3
(July 2012) (defining “ciphertext” and “plaintext”); Eric A. Hibbard, Encryption: The Basics, in
DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK 177, 178 (Lucy Thomson ed., A.B.A. 2011); DAVID
SALOMON, DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY: ENCRYPTION AND INFORMATION HIDING 7 (2003)
(noting that “[e]ncrypting a message involves two ingredients, an algorithm and a key”).
8. SALOMON, supra note 7, at 7.
9. Id. The Caesar Cipher is so named because Julius Caesar used it.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 8.
12. NIST Special Publication 800-57, supra note 7, at 28 (defining “Symmetric-key
algorithm”).
13. Id. at 26 (defining “[p]ublic-key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm”).
14. For a discussion of the ubiquitous use of ROT13 on the early Usenet as a form of insider
humor, see the Wikipedia entry for “ROT13.” See What Is ROT13?, IND. U., https://kb.iu.edu/d/
aeol (last visited May 4, 2018).
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bit decryption keys and is practically unbreakable with existing computer
power.15
B. Full Disk Encryption
It is easy to copy or “image” the contents of a computer’s hard drive
or a smart phone’s memory. Every state has at least one computer
forensics lab capable of producing an exact copy of a hard drive, and
regional labs coordinate among multiple states and the federal
government.16 Courts routinely issue search warrants for the seizure of
personal computers, laptops, and hard drives based on probable cause that
the devices contain contraband (such as child pornography files) or other
evidence of criminal activity (such as spreadsheets or other documents
detailing financial crimes).17 The investigation of “computer crime” is
now a mainstream law enforcement activity.
Despite the sophistication of law enforcement, however, these
forensic laboratories cannot crack robust disk encryption. The use of full
disk encryption (FDE), through which the entire contents of a hard drive
are encrypted, can render the drive completely opaque to law
enforcement. In popular computer lingo, the drive becomes a “brick.”18
A proper understanding of FDE requires some background in personal
computer architecture. Common desktop and laptop computers are
comprised of a set of basic components, including hardware, operating
system (OS) software, and application software.19 The hardware
15. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROCESSING
STANDARD 197: ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES) (Nov. 26, 2001),
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf; ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
(AES), CNSS POLICY NO. 15, FACT SHEET NO. 1, 2 (June 2003), https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/
media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/cnss15fs.pdf (stating that
“the design and strength of all key lengths of the AES algorithm (i.e., 128, 192 and 256) are
sufficient to protect classified information up to the SECRET level. TOP SECRET information
will require use of either the 192 or 256 key lengths”); New Attack on AES, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(July 1, 2009, 11:49 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/07/new_attack_
on_a.html (noting that a recently published possible method of attacking AES remains “far, far
beyond our capabilities of computation”).
16. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB, http://www.njrcfl.org/
(last visited June 9, 2014).
17. See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 61–63, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/
01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf.
18. See Bricked, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term
=bricked (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
19. See generally IAN WEINAND, COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE FOR BEGINNERS 35 (2016),
http://bottomupcs.sourceforge.net/csbu/c1453.html (explaining the functions of a central
processing unit); id. at 62 (explaining the role of the operation system); Basic Computer
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components include a motherboard with the microprocessor and random
access memory (RAM), input and output devices (such as a keyboard,
mouse, and monitor), and long term memory, which typically consists of
one or more magnetic hard drives. Application software may include
word processors (such as Microsoft Word), spreadsheets (such as
Microsoft Excel), presentation tools (such as Microsoft PowerPoint), and
a wide variety of other programs that accept user input and produce
related content.20 The computer user employs application programs to
produce user-generated content, such as word-processing documents.21
The OS, in a sense, sits “between” the computer’s hardware and
application software layers.22 The OS coordinates the operations of the
computer’s various hardware components and allows those components
and the application software to “talk” with each other. A computer’s OS
usually resides on the computer’s primary hard drive.23 Before the OS is
accessed, the hard drive must boot up, which requires some degree of
coordination among the computer’s hardware components before the OS
begins to play its coordinating function.24 This pre-OS coordinating
function is performed by software routines that are hard-coded on chips
on the motherboard.25 For IBM-compatible PCs (the kind of machine that
runs Microsoft Windows as an OS), these routines are called the BIOS
(Basic Input/Output System).26 When a new primary hard drive is added
to a PC, the drive is “formatted” by the system to incorporate a “pre-boot”
sector containing BIOS code.27 After the drive is formatted, whenever the
computer is powered up, the BIOS code on the motherboard interacts
with the BIOS code on the hard drive and then the OS is accessed. 28 A
highly stylized representation of these relationships is as follows:

Architecture, in COMPUTER SCIENCE EDUCATION PROJECT, https://www.phy.ornl.gov/csep/ca/
node2.html#SECTION00020000000000000000 (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (explaining the basic
computer components).
20. Basic Computer Architecture, supra note 19.
21. See generally DAN GOOKIN, PCS FOR DUMMIES (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 12th ed. 2005)
(describing the general uses and applications of computers).
22. See MIROSLAW MALEK, COMPUTER SCI. ENGINEERING, OPERATING SYSTEM 2,
https://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/C15/E6-45-03-01.pdf, (last visited May 4, 2018).
23. See Boot Device, COMPUTER HOPE, https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/b/
bootdevi.htm (last updated Dec. 20, 2017).
24. Id.
25. See Hard Drive, COMPUTER HOPE, https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/h/
harddriv.htm (last updated Apr. 1, 2018).
26. See id.
27. See Pre-boot Authentication, SECUDE, https://web.archive.org/web/20120304234645/
http://www.secude.com/media-room/white-papers/full-disk-encryption/pre-boot-authentication/
(last visited May 4, 2018).
28. Id.
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User-Generated Content
Application Programs
Operating System
BIOS

Hardware
Basic computer disk encryption involves applying an encryption
algorithm to files on the disk so that they are not readable by humans
without decryption.29 For example, a word processing document listing
the secret formula for Coke could be encrypted so that only persons with
the decryption key could read the information in the file. While
encryption of selected files might be adequate for some purposes, a third
party could still view non-encrypted files on the hard drive, and also
could learn by inspecting the hard drive that it contains encrypted files.
The following shows how this sort of encryption relates to the computer
architecture:
User-Generated Content
Application Programs
Operating System
BIOS
Hardware

Unencrypted
Files
Hard Drive

Encrypted
File

“Full disk encryption” (FDE), in contrast, is a method of securing the
entire disk so that all of the disk’s contents are encrypted and no one
without the necessary password and key can even boot up the disk.30
29. See Troubleshooting Hard Drive Encryption Issues, DELL KNOWLEDGE BASE,
https://www.dell.com/support/article/us/en/19/sln155364/troubleshooting-hard-drive-encryption
-issues?lang=en (last modified Mar. 7, 2018).
30. See id.
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Arguably, FDE obscures the question whether the disk contains any files
at all—although, as discussed in Part II below, courts have not yet
correctly understood the implications of this technology for Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence.
FDE involves the encryption of all files on the hard drive together
with a password or biometric lock on the drive’s boot sector.31 The FDE
application writes some code to the drive’s boot sector that interacts with
the BIOS upon start-up.32 This code requires the entry of a user-generated
password in order for the boot sequence to continue.33 Once the machine
boots up, the user-generated password or biometric identifier can be used
as a “seed” for a randomly-generated encryption key.34 The encryption
key is employed in connection with an algorithm such as AES to encrypt
all the files on the hard drive.35 While the user is working with a file, the
decryption key makes the file readable to the user and encrypts any
additional content on the fly.36 This sort of encryption scheme can be
illustrated as follows:
User-Generated Content
Application Programs
Operating System
BIOS

Pre-Boot
Authentication

Hardware

Encrypted
Files

Hard Drive

31. Kaspersky Lab Online Courses, KL 108.10: Encryption, Ch. 2: Full Disk Encryption,
KASPERSKY LAB, slide 2, http://support.kaspersky.com/learning/courses/kl_108.10/unit1_ chapter2.
32. SYMANTEC, WHITE PAPER: HOW DRIVE ENCRYPTION WORKS 1–2 (2012),
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_papers/b-how-drive-encryption-works
_WP_21275920.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
33. Id. at 1.
34. Kaspersky Lab Online Courses, KL 108.10: Encryption, Ch. 2: Full Disk Encryption,
supra note 31, at slide 4.
35. Id. at slide 2.
36. Id. at slide 3.
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FDE is a widely available technology. Until very recently, an open
source project called “TrueCrypt” was freely available to anyone
online.37 Commercial FDE products such as “DriveCrypt” can be
purchased for less than $60, and products such as Sophos SafeGuard
work with Microsoft Bitlocker to provide enterprise-level encryption.38
Even more directly, Microsoft Bitlocker is now integrated with Windows
10, so that FDE is available to any Windows 10 user.39
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT MEETS ENCRYPTION
A. Background
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”40 This provision
does not protect against mere disclosure of private information.41 Privacy
is the domain of the Fourth Amendment and its probable cause, warrant,
and related requirements.42 As the Supreme Court stated in Fisher v.
United States,43 “the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe
the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial
communication that is incriminating.”44 The fact that a warrant or
subpoena might require a criminal suspect to produce documents that
might contain incriminating information therefore does not in itself

37. The TrueCrypt source code was available at http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/ until the
code’s developers shocked observers by discontinuing the site. See TrueCrypt Final Release
Repository, GIBSON RES. CORP., https://www.grc.com/misc/truecrypt/truecrypt.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2018); see also James Lyne, Open Source Crypto TrueCrypt Disappears with Suspicious
Cloud of Mystery, FORBES (May 29, 2014, 3:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/james
lyne/2014/05/29/open-source-crypto-truecrypt-disappears-with-suspicious-cloud-of-mystery/;
Tales from the TrueCrypt, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2014), http://www.economist.com/ news/scienceand-technology/21603407-mysterious-useful-piece-software-disappears-mysteriously-tales.
38. DriveCrypt 1344-Bit – Disk Encryption, SECURSTAR, http://www.securstar.biz/
drivecrypt.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2018); Sophos SafeGuard Enterprise, SOPHOS
http://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/factsheets/sophossafeguardenterprisedsna.pdf
?la=en (last visited Mar. 16, 2018); BitLocker, MICROSOFT: WINDOWS IT PRO CENTER (Oct.
16, 2017), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/
bitlocker-overview.
39. See Bitlocker Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), MICROSOFT: WINDOWS IT PRO
CENTER (Oct. 16, 2017), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/informationprotection/bitlocker/bitlocker-frequently-asked-questions.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
42. Id.
43. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
44. Id. at 408 (emphasis omitted).
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violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled selfincrimination.45
The Supreme Court has wrestled with this distinction between
“privacy” and “testimony” in a long line of cases going back to
Schmerber v. California.46 In Schmerber, the defendant was in a car
accident and was arrested at a hospital on suspicion of driving under the
influence of alcohol.47 At the direction of a police officer, a physician at
the hospital took a blood sample, which was tested for blood alcohol
level.48 The defendant claimed that this non-consensual blood test
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.49 The
Court disagreed.50
According to the Court, “[t]he distinction which has emerged, often
expressed in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against
compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does
not violate it.”51 The Schmerber Court acknowledged that “there will be
many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests
seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for example, lie
detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation,
may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially
testimonial.”52 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that “[n]ot even a
shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by
the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical
analysis.”53
Subsequently, Fisher tested the line between privacy and testimony in
relation to documentary evidence.54 In that case, the defendants were
accused of tax violations and the documents were subpoenaed from the
defendants’ accountant or attorney.55 The defendants argued that
compelled production of the documents would amount to an admission
that the documents existed and were under their control.56 The Court
rejected this argument.57 According to the Court,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
384 U.S. 757 (1966); id. at 764.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id. at 765.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 421–23 (1976).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 410–11.
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It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and
possession of the papers rises to the level of testimony within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The papers belong
to the accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind
usually prepared by an accountant working on the tax returns
of his client. Surely the Government is in no way relying on
the “truth-telling” of the taxpayer to prove the existence of
or his access to the documents. . . .58
The Court then introduced what has become known as the “foregone
conclusion” doctrine:
The existence and location of the papers are a foregone
conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum
total of the Government’s information by conceding that he
in fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by
enforcement of the summons “no constitutional rights are
touched. The question is not of testimony but of
surrender.”59
The Fisher Court listed many kinds of potentially incriminating
physical evidence a criminal suspect could be compelled to produce
without implicating the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, including blood samples, handwriting exemplars, voice
exemplars, and trying on items of clothing.60 Each of these examples
involved the compulsion of some act that was not itself considered
testimonial. Other examples of compelled conduct have included
compelling the suspect to submit to “fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to
stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.”61
It is unclear from the Fisher Court’s “foregone conclusion” statement
whether a given act is inherently non-testimonial or an exception to the
Fifth Amendment privilege. This confusion is evident in the forced
decryption cases discussed in Section II.B below. The confusion is
heightened by two Supreme Court cases subsequent to Fisher that also

58. Id. at 411 (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 408 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966) (refusing to
extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege to blood samples)); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1967) (refusing to extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege to voice exemplars); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265–67 (1967) (refusing to
extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege to handwriting exemplars); Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (refusing to extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
to clothing).
61. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
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factor into the “act of production”/“foregone conclusion” analysis: Doe
v. United States62 and United States v. Hubbell.63
In Doe, the principles discussed in Schmerber and Fisher were applied
to a proposed order requiring a criminal defendant to sign a consent form
authorizing foreign banks to produce his banking records.64 The
government suspected the defendant had deposited unreported income in
foreign banks.65 The defendant argued that signing the consent forms
would constitute a “testimonial communication” because it would
comprise “a declarative statement of consent made by Doe to the foreign
banks.”66 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, disagreed.67
According to Justice Blackmun, “in order to be testimonial, an
accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a
factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled
to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”68 The primary purpose of the Fifth
Amendment, Justice Blackmun noted, was to prevent the “inquisitorial
method of putting the accused upon his oath and compelling him to
answer questions designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without
evidence from another source.”69 The consent forms at issue did not
identify any specific account, state whether any documents were in
existence at any particular bank, or include any admission about the
authenticity of any records produced by any bank.70
The sole dissenter, Justice Stevens, argued that “[i]f John Doe can be
compelled to use his mind to assist the Government in developing its
case, I think he will be forced ‘to be a witness against himself.’”71 Justice
Stevens argued that a witness “may in some cases be forced to surrender
a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents, but I do not
believe he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safeby word or deed.”72
In the Court’s next effort to distinguish between compelled testimony
and compelled production of physical evidence, United States v. Hubbell,
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion.73 Hubbell involved the
famous (or infamous) “Whitewater” investigation and prosecutions of
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

487 U.S. 201 (1988).
530 U.S. 27 (2000); id. at 36; Doe, 487 U.S. at 209.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 219.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 29 (2000).
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Webster Hubbell.74 Hubbell was serving a sentence for tax evasion and
mail fraud resulting from a plea agreement with the Whitewater Special
Prosecutor when he was served with a subpoena duces tecum for
documents before a grand jury investigating further alleged fraud
involving Whitewater.75 Hubbell was ordered by the trial court to produce
the documents under the federal grand jury immunity statute.76 He
produced the documents in response to this order, and was subsequently
indicted on further tax and mail fraud charges.77 The trial court dismissed
the indictment because it believed the indictment was based on
information in the documents in violation of the immunity statute.78 After
an appeal and a somewhat complicated conditional plea agreement, the
immunity issue was heard by the Supreme Court.79
Justice Stevens noted that “there is a significant difference between
the use of compulsion to extort communications from a defendant and
compelling a person to engage in conduct that may be incriminating.”80
He further acknowledged that “a person may be required to produce
specific documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of
fact or belief because the creation of those documents was not
‘compelled’ within the meaning of the privilege.”81 Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens stated, the “act of production” itself could constitute a testimonial
admission that “the papers existed, were in [the defendant’s] possession
or control, and were authentic.”82 According to Justice Stevens,
[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make
extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying
the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the
subpoena. . . . The assembly of those documents was like
telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like
being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.83
Justice Stevens also rejected the government’s argument that the
“foregone conclusion” analysis in Fisher saved the government’s case
against Hubbell. According to Justice Stevens,

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002–6003).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 43.
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[w]hatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale,
the facts of this case plainly fall outside of it. While in Fisher
the Government already knew that the documents were in
the attorneys’ possession and could independently confirm
their existence and authenticity through the accountants who
created them, here the Government has not shown that it had
any prior knowledge of either the existence or the
whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately
produced by respondent.84
He therefore held that the indictment would violate the statutory grant of
immunity and must be dismissed.85
Under the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial acts of
production, then, (1) the provision of physical acts or samples, such as
standing in a lineup or giving a blood sample; and (2) the mere production
of documents generally are not considered testimonial, while acts that
convey information about the nature, location, or authenticity of
documents or materials could be testimonial. Justice Stevens’ dicta
concerning the strongbox key and combination in his dissent in Doe,
echoed in his majority opinion in Hubbell as applied to the foregone
conclusion doctrine, has been featured in the contemporary debate over
compelled disclosure of passwords tied to encryption keys. As the
summary in the next Section suggests, courts are struggling to apply these
concepts in the domain of computer files and digital encryption.
B. Recent Cases Involving Compelled Decryption
A handful of recent cases address how these principles should apply
to encrypted hard drives. As noted above, many of these cases assume
that the production of a password protecting encryption is a testimonial
act, but construe the “foregone conclusion” doctrine as an exception to
the Fifth Amendment privilege. However, in an important—but
incorrectly decided—case, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the foregone
conclusion doctrine may not apply when the contents of a hard drive are
both unknown and encrypted.86 Three other cases involve encryption that
is accessed by biometric identification (in those cases, a fingerprint), with
differing results.87

84. Id. at 44–45.
85. Id. at 45–46.
86. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335,
1344–46 (11th Cir. 2012).
87. See State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 150–51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), aff’d, 905
N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 2018); State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 134–35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 2014 WL 10355635, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
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1. Compelled Production of Passwords Controlling Encryption
In one of the earliest reported cases on this issue, United States v.
Fricosu,88 FBI agents had seized a number of computers, pursuant to
valid search warrants, at the home where defendant resided.89 Of three
laptop computers seized, one was encrypted with a program called PGP
Desktop.90 During a recorded conversation with her husband, a codefendant who was incarcerated, Ms. Fricosu seemed to admit that the
encrypted laptop contained a file or files relevant to the investigation.91
The government then sought a writ under the All Writs Act compelling
defendant to produce the contents of the encrypted hard dive.92
Based on the recorded telephone conversation, the court concluded
that “[t]here is little question here but that the government knows of the
existence and location of the computer’s files. The fact that it does not
know the specific content of any specific documents is not a barrier to
production.”93 The court further found that that “the government has met
its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Toshiba
Satellite M305 laptop computer belongs to Ms. Fricosu, or, in the
alternative, that she was its sole or primary user, who, in any event, can
access the encrypted contents of that laptop computer.”94 It was also
significant to the court that the government offered Ms. Friscosu
immunity.95 The court therefore found that an order requiring production
of the laptop hard drive’s decrypted contents would not violate the Fifth
Amendment.96 The order entered by the court compelled the defendant to
perform the steps necessary to decrypt the computer’s contents and
prohibited the government from using those contents against Ms.
Friscosu.97
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit suggested in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011,98 that the foregone
88. 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012).
89. Id. at 1234.
90. Id. PGP Desktop is a form of FDE offered by Symantec. See Easy-to-Use Decryption
Software, SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/products-solutions/products/buy.jsp%3Fpcid
%3Dpcat_info_risk_comp%26pvid%3Ddesktop_home_1%26om_sem_cid%3Dbiz_sem_nam_u
s_Google_SMB_Store_PGP_Desktop_Home%26mktsrc%3Dpaidsearch%26om_sem_kw%3Dp
gp%2Bhome (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (describing the PGP Desktop Home product and showing
the price per license).
91. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1237.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1238.
96. Id. at 1237.
97. Id.
98. 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012).
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conclusion doctrine cannot apply unless the government knows of
specific files subject to the warrant or other process that are stored on the
subject device.99 Central to the court’s decision in that case was the
court’s belief that the government did not know whether any files resided
on the encrypted portion of the defendant’s hard drive.100 The court noted
that the encryption software used by the defendant fills up free space on
the encrypted portion of a drive with random characters.101 According to
the court, “because the TrueCrypt [encryption] program displays random
characters if there are files and if there is empty space, we simply do not
know what, if anything, was hidden based on the facts before us.”102
The court concluded that, because “random characters are not files,” the
government had not shown “that the drives actually contain any files, nor
has it shown which of the estimated twenty million files the drives are
capable of holding may prove useful.”103
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach did not prevail in one of the most
comprehensive opinions on forced encryption in the federal and state case
law, Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt.104 In that case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held, in a 5–2 opinion, that the foregone
conclusion doctrine can apply to passwords that protect encryption
keys.105 Defendant Gelfgatt, an attorney, was charged with crimes
involving mortgage fraud.106 Pursuant to a search warrant, state police
seized four computers from Gelfgatt’s residence that were encrypted with
DriveCrypt Plus full disk encryption software.107 During his
interrogation, Gelfgatt admitted that the computers were encrypted and
that he held the passwords needed to decrypt the computers, but refused
to turn over the passwords.108 The Commonwealth moved for an order to
compel decryption, which was denied by the lower courts.109
99. Id. at 1344–46.
100. Id. at 1346 (“Nothing in the record before us reveals that the Government knows
whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives . . . .”).
101. Id. at 1340 n.11.
102. Id. at 1347.
103. Id.; cf. SEC v. Huang, 2015 WL 5611644, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (following In re Grand
Jury).
104. 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014); id. at 619. The author of this Article filed an amicus brief
in this case in support of the Commonwealth, joined by The Massachusetts Chiefs of Police
Association and NW3C (The National White Collar Crime Center). See Brief of Amicus Curiae
Professor David W. Opderbeck, Supported by the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association,
Inc. and NW3C, Inc., Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605 (Mass. 2014).
105. Id. at 617.
106. Id. at 609.
107. Id. at 610.
108. Id. at 610–11.
109. Id. at 611.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Court assumed, without much analysis,
that the disclosure of a password is a testimonial communication.110 The
court stated that “[b]y such action, the defendant implicitly would be
acknowledging that he has ownership and control of the computers and
their contents,” which differs from giving a physical evidence such as a
blood sample or handwriting exemplar.111 However, the court held that
the foregone conclusion exception applied because there was clear
evidence that Gelfgatt had been involved in some of the allegedly
fraudulent mortgage transactions and had acknowledged that he kept
encrypted files relating to these transactions.112
Justice Lenk, joined by Justice Duffy, filed a dissenting opinion.113
Justice Lenk relied heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena for the argument that the government must show a
degree of particularity about particular files or documents that is
“significantly greater than what is required to show probable cause.”114
Therefore, Justice Lenk concluded, “the ‘reasonable particularity’
standard requires much more than government knowledge that a
defendant owns or has access to a particular computer.”115 In Justice
Lenk’s view, the Commonwealth could not satisfy this standard.
Like the majority in Gelfgatt, the Third Circuit also recently has
questioned the Eleventh Circuit’s approach.116 In United States v. Apple
Macpro Computer,117 the defendant was suspected of accessing child
pornography over the internet.118 A state search warrant was issued for
the defendant’s residence, and the police seized an Apple iPhone 5S, an
Apple iPhone 6 Plus, an Apple Mac Pro Computer, and two attached
external hard drives, all of which were encrypted.119 U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Agents then obtained a federal search warrant to
examine these devices.120 The defendant voluntarily provided a password
for the iPhone 5S, but refused to provide passwords to decrypt the Mac
Pro or hard drives.121 The defendant also provided the passcode to unlock

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 617 (Lenk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 620–22.
Id. at 622.
See United States v. Apple Macpro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2017).
851 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the iPhone 6 Plus, but refused to provide a passcode for an application on
that phone that contained encrypted files.122
Government forensic analysts discovered the Mac Pro password
without the defendant’s assistance and found on the internal hard drive
one child pornography image as well as logs showing that the computer
had been used to access known child pornography sites and to download
thousands of known child pornography files.123 Investigators also
interviewed the defendant’s sister, who stated that the defendant had
shown her child pornography images from the encrypted external hard
drives.124 Based on this information, the government obtained an order
under the All Writs Act requiring the defendant to produce the devices
and hard drives in a fully unencrypted state.125
The magistrate judge denied the defendant’s motion to quash the All
Writs Act order.126 The defendant subsequently appeared for a forensic
examination at the Delaware County Police Department.127 He produced
the iPhone 6 Plus with all files decrypted, which included photographs of
his four-year-old niece’s genitals.128 He claimed he could not remember
the correct passwords to unlock the external hard drives and subsequently
was held in contempt for failing to produce those drives in a decrypted
state.129
The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to quash.130 The
Third Circuit noted that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena would not require a different result because the evidence
was sufficient to show that files existed on the encrypted devices and that
the defendant could access those devices.131 In a footnote, the Third
Circuit also noted that the Government’s knowledge of files on the
encrypted devices might not reflect the proper inquiry under the foregone
conclusion exception.132 Instead, the court suggested, “a very sound
argument can be made that the foregone conclusion doctrine properly
focuses on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is
implicit in the act of production” and that the relevant testimony is that

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 243.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 248 n.7.
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the defendant knows the passwords to decrypt the devices.133 If the
surrounding evidence shows that this testimony is a foregone conclusion,
the exception might apply even absent any showing of what files the
device might contain.134
2. Compelled Production of Biometric Identification
Controlling Encryption
Other courts have distinguished passwords and biometric
identification to unlock encrypted devices. In Commonwealth v. Baust,135
a Virginia trial court held that production of a passcode to a cell phone is
a testimonial act and that the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply
because the subject of the testimony is not about the existence and
authenticity of documents on the phone, but rather is about the password
itself.136 The court noted: “[I]f the password was a foregone conclusion,
the Commonwealth would not need to compel Defendant to produce it
because they would already know it.”137 In contrast, the court held, “[t]he
fingerprint, like a key . . . does not require the witness to divulge anything
through his mental processes,” and therefore the biometric identification
could be compelled.138
Other courts have disagreed with this distinction. In State v. Stahl,139
for example, a Florida appellate court questioned Justice Stevens’s
distinction in Doe between a key and a combination, and noted that
surrendering a key to a strongbox or stating the combination to a
strongbox lock has the same effect.140 The court further questioned “the
continuing viability of any distinction as technology advances” and
suggested that the use of a passcode on a smart phone should not result
in greater constitutional protection than the use of a “fingerprint as the
passcode.”141 The court held that the foregone conclusion doctrine should
apply if the State establishes three elements: (1) “it knows with
reasonable particularity that the passcode exists”; (2) the passcode “is
within the accused’s possession or control”; and (3) the passcode “is
133. Id. The relevant testimony, according to the Third Circuit, could simply be “I, John Doe,
know the password for these devices.” Id.
134. Id.
135. 89 Va. Cir. 267, 2014 WL 10355635 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
136. Id. at *4.
137. Id.
138. Id.; cf. State v. Diamond, 890 N.W.2d 143, 149–51 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding
order to produce fingerprint to unlock cellphone and distinguishing testimonial act of producing
a password from non-testimonial act of supplying a fingerprint key), aff’d, 905 N.W.2d 870
(Minn. 2018).
139. 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
140. Id. at 134–35.
141. Id. at 135.
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authentic.”142 The element of authenticity, the court suggested, would
invariably be satisfied, because “[i]f the doctrines are to continue to be
applied to passcodes, decryption keys, and the like, we must recognize
that the technology is self-authenticating [because] no other means of
authentication may exist.”143 Therefore, the court noted, “[i]f the phone
or computer is accessible once the passcode or key has been entered, the
passcode or key is authentic.”144 In short, the court concluded, “[t]his is
a case of surrender and not testimony.”145
III. ENCRYPTION, SPEECH, AND TESTIMONY
A. What Is “Testimony?”
As discussed in Part II, the cases that have addressed compelled
disclosure of encryption keys under the Fifth Amendment circle around
the question whether an encryption key or password is a form of speech
or communication. Case law does not explore the line between speech or
communication and actions that are not speech or communication with
any degree of philosophical depth, and commentators continue to dispute
the distinction.146
Some scholars have sought to circumvent the question by grounding
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in a right of
privacy.147 As Ronald Allen and Kristin Mace have noted, however,
privacy based justifications “cannot explain why the privilege applies or
when it does,” since the government otherwise has a “right to every man’s
evidence,” even if that evidence incriminates a family member or is
embarrassing even if not incriminating.148 In contrast, privacy questions
are directly addressed by the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure
limitations.149
The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, although
involving underlying privacy interests, seems to concern a particular kind

142. Id. at 136.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 137; see Efren Lemus, Comment, When Fingerprints Are Key: Reinstating
Privacy to the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Light of Fingerprint Encryption of
Smartphones, 70 SMU L. REV. 533, 539–44 (2017).
146. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained
and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 259 (2004) (noting that “[t]he Court
has failed to provide a definition of ‘testimony’ that can explain its own cases”).
147. See id. at 261.
148. Id. at 261–62 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972)).
149. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1236
(1988).
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of speech-act. Other scholars, along with most of the case law, therefore
have focused on what comprises “testimony.”150
Allen and Mace suggest the Supreme Court views “testimony” as an
act of substantive cognition—“the product of cognition that results in
holding or asserting propositions with truth-value.”151 They suggest that
“[c]ognition ‘involves the acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of
knowledge.’”152 They apply their definition to the example of a suspect
who is compelled to submit a polygraph examination while the examiner
points to locations on a map where a murder victim’s body might be
buried, such that the suspect’s physiological responses reveal the likely
location of the body.153 As Allen and Mace note, “there is perhaps
universal agreement” that this evidence should be inadmissible under the
Fifth Amendment to implicate the suspect in the murder, even though the
suspect has not verbally spoken.154 They suggest that their definition of
“testimony” explains this intuition because the polygraph test records
biometric responses that convey knowledge held by the suspect.155
Allen and Mace recognize that the foregone conclusion doctrine poses
problems for this definition.156 The act of producing a document involves
cognition, and it seems unclear under their theory why any exception
should be made for the Fifth Amendment testimonial protection of such
an act just because the location and existence of the document is a
foregone conclusion. They suggest the difference could arise from the
degree of cognition required.157 If the witness must exercise relatively
minimal cognitive “efforts,” such as when a relatively narrow subpoena
describes as specific set of documents, there is less offense than when the
witness must expend greater cognitive efforts to identify, locate, and
gather documents potentially responsive to a broader subpoena.158
It is unclear, however, what Allen and Mace mean by cognitive
“efforts” or whether such a concept has any scientific or philosophical
purchase. Could we measure, say, the number of neuronal connections
150. One scholar who avoided the question of defining “testimony” without adopting a
privacy-based rationale was William Stuntz. See id. at 1228. Stuntz argued that Fifth Amendment
privilege is justified because it excuses witness from the temptation to commit perjury. See
generally id. at 1228–29. This is a fascinating rationale for the privilege generally, but it does not
seek to address, given the privilege exists, whether or when a foregone conclusion doctrine should
apply to limit the privilege.
151. Allen & Mace, supra note 146, at 266.
152. Id. at 267 (quoting MARGARET W. MATLIN, COGNITION 2 (3d ed. 1994)).
153. Id. at 248–49.
154. Id. at 249.
155. Id. at 269.
156. Id. at 287–89.
157. Id. at 288–89.
158. Id.
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used to respond to a narrow subpoena versus a broad subpoena? The
notion of measuring neuronal questions, of course, is not realistic, but the
point is that cognitive “effort” seems impossible to quantify. Moreover,
even if some measure of cognitive “efforts” were possible, why would it
matter to a definition of “testimony?” Relatively little cognitive effort,
presumably, is expended in the response to a simple question such as,
“Did you kill the victim—yes or no?” But a witness could not be
compelled to answer such a question.
In his article Testimony, Michael Pardo discusses when a
communicative act might comprise “testimony” based on the speaker’s
intent to convey knowledge.159 Pardo’s main concern in that paper is
epistemology, or what counts as knowledge.160 In the category of “natural
testimony,” Pardo notes, (1) “the speaker must intend a listener or an
audience to believe that the speaker has competence, authority, or
credentials to assert the proposition,” and (2) “the content of the
communicative act must be what conveys information to the hearer.”161
However, the actual hearer need not be the intended hearer, as in the case
of a journal entry or diary later read by a third party. 162 It is enough that
the speaker intends to convey the requisite authority to some specific
audience and that the communicative act conveys information to
whomever ultimately is the hearer.163
Pardo’s article explores various “epistemic ‘pathways’” through
which natural testimony can generate knowledge, as well as “epistemic
‘dead ends’” through which natural testimony sometimes fails to generate
knowledge.164 He suggests that the rules concerning formal, in-court
testimony draw fruitfully on this epistemic account of testimony and
seeks to clarify the problematic question of hearsay as well as various
constitutional rules concerning testimony.165 Concerning the Fifth
Amendment, Pardo argues that the Court’s distinction between
“testimonial” and other acts first drawn in Schmerber fits his framework
for what comprises “testimony.”166 An act can satisfy both of Pardo’s two
conditions whether it is in the form of a verbal statement or action.167
But the act of production doctrine cases, Pardo claims, “have
analytically confused and misapplied certain aspects of the concept of
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 120–21 (2007).
See id. at 125–32.
Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 139–44.
Id. at 144, 148, 164–65.
Id. at 178, 188.
See id. at 188.
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testimony.”168 He is particularly critical of the Court’s assumption under
the foregone conclusion doctrine that the government’s prior knowledge
of the testimony’s contents should matter.169 Pardo concedes that “[i]f a
speaker knows that the hearer already knows a proposition or has the
same or superior evidence compared with the speaker, the speaker is not
testifying to that proposition by asserting it” and further that there is no
“testimony” when “a hearer who already knows the proposition or
believes she has the same or superior evidence.”170 Therefore, under
Pardo’s definition, if the information is a foregone conclusion to the
government, the act of production is not “testimony” vis-à-vis the
government. However, Pardo argues, the government is not the only
audience for the information. A judge or jury, for whom the information
is not a foregone conclusion, is also an audience, and in many ways a
more important one.171 Pardo concludes: “[A]n act of production ought
to be deemed testimonial for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause
when, under the particular circumstances of the case, the act implicitly
communicates information, and it is within the scope of the right when
the content of the implicit communication was compelled and is
incriminating.”172
There are two problems with Pardo’s treatment of this question. First,
the distinction he draws between “the government” and a judge or jury as
audiences for the communication is not so clear as he suggests. The
“government,” (i.e., the prosecution) acts on behalf of the State (i.e., the
political community of the people), and the judge and jury also act on
behalf of the state. The “audience,” then, is always the state. The
differences between the prosecutor, judge, and jury arise from their
different functions within the machinery of the state. If some information
presents itself as a “foregone conclusion” to the prosecution—that is, if
some information is not natural “testimony” to the prosecution—it also
ipso facto is a foregone conclusion and not formal “testimony” to the
judge and jury. The prosecution, judge, and jury play different roles in
the system and have different duties from each other. Both the judge and
jury in their own ways serve as checks to protect accused citizens against
the excessive zeal of prosecutors in an adversarial system, and the jury
also serves as a check on judges. Nevertheless, as Judge Jack Weinstein

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 184.
See id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188.
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has noted, “[i]n a sense, the jury was, and remains, the direct voice of the
sovereign, in a collaborative effort with the judge.”173
Second, the question of what comprises the “content” of a
“communicative act” is precisely what is at issue in an act of production.
On this point the act of production and foregone conclusion doctrines
attempt to demarcate between actions that are sufficiently informationladen to be considered “testimony” and those that are not.
Consider the compelled blood alcohol test in Schmerber.174 The fact
that the blood tested was the suspect’s own blood, and the fact of the
suspect’s blood alcohol content level, is not anything the suspect intends
to convey, and indeed the suspect does not “convey” it at all, unless the
suspect is identical with the chemical information in his blood. There is
no intent involved at all, unless the blood itself has some quality of
agency or intentionality identical to the suspect’s own agency and
intentionality. The authority supporting the factual claims that a test was
performed on this suspect’s blood giving a particular blood alcohol level
is the authority of the lab technicians who will testify about how the blood
was drawn and what tests were conducted. The suspect is not required to
testify about the authenticity of the blood sample or the results of the
blood test.
The same is true for the production of papers or things known to be in
a suspect’s possession. The authority for authenticating that these papers
were turned over by the suspect in response to a subpoena or warrant is
inherent in the subpoena or warrant itself and in the fact that the papers
were turned over. The suspect is not required to testify about the
authenticity of the documents or the meaning of their contents. The
authority for these facts resides in other information about the state of the
world and the actions of other agents, not in any intention or
communication of the suspect.
In a subsequent article, The Epistemology of Testimony, Pardo refines
his discussion of these questions.175 In that article, Pardo suggests that
whether something is considered “testimony” depends on whether the
defendant is serving as an “epistemic authority” for a proposition.176 For
example, in the case of a blood sample to determine blood type, Pardo
suggests, the defendant is not serving as an epistemic authority as to

173. United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); cf. Douglas A.
Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement in Habeas
Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 888 (2010).
174. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).
175. Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1023 (2008).
176. Id. at 1040.
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blood type, so this kind of sample is not “testimony.”177 He suggests that
“[o]ne does not have to posit distinct material and non-physical realms to
see an epistemic difference between words and blood.”178
This notion of “epistemic authority” is helpful, but in the age of DNA
evidence, the line between “words and blood” might be fuzzier than
Pardo suggests. Interestingly for the purpose of this paper, the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that Schmerber applies to blood
tests to extract genetic information stored in a national database.179 A
person’s DNA conveys far more information than a blood alcohol test,
including, for example, the ability to place a person at a crime scene based
on DNA samples from hair, blood, skin, semen, and the like left at the
scene. A person’s DNA also can communicate more definitive
information in many ways than documents or things in that person’s
possession. DNA evidence can offer stronger “smoking gun” evidence
than a smoking gun itself. If a person provides a sample of her blood (or,
more likely, a mouth swab), implicitly acknowledging it is her blood, and
the blood (or swab) contains genetic information highly specific to that
individual, where does the epistemic authority lie? It seems impossible to
stretch the concept of “testimony” to include DNA evidence, again unless
we wish to reduce a person’s agency, intentionality, and speech to his or
her genetic code. Genes do not testify; people testify. This is why notions
of epistemic authority must be tied to the concept of what comprises a
communicative act. As Pardo suggests, in “testimony,” a speaker makes
“an assertion.”180 The concept of an “assertion” involves an intent to
convey information.
The example of genetic information in relation to “testimony” is
particularly apt to the discussion of decryption keys because DNA, like
encryption keys and passwords, is a kind of “code.” The question about
the connection between “information” and “communication” is basic to
information theory, which underlies modern computing technology. The
following Section shows how information theory clarifies the foregone
conclusion doctrine in relation to encryption keys and passwords. It
further explores this difficult question as it has arisen in two other areas
of law: the First Amendment and copyright law. Part IV then extends
these insights to argue that neither encryption code nor passwords that

177. Id.
178. Id. at 1041.
179. United States. v. Reynard, 473 F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007); United States. v. Bean,
214 F. App’x 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating that “the information that is extracted from the blood, DNA, is another form of physical,
genetic identification of an individual not unlike a photograph or fingerprint and is thus also not
protected by the Fifth Amendment”).
180. Id. at 1037.
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protect encryption are forms of “speech” that could comprise testimonial
acts.
B. Encryption, Semiotics, and Information Theory
It should be clear from the discussion of the Caesar Cipher in Part I
above that the key “13” communicates nothing at all about the substance
of the text “cynl vg ntnva fnz.” Arguably, the number 13 in this context
has no semantic content. The number 13 does not even say, “This
message is encoded with a ROT13 cipher.” A person who wants to use
the number 13 as a key would already have to know (or guess) that this
is a ROT13-encoded message. The number itself is nothing but the key
that converts “cynl vg ntnva fnz” into the readable English message “play
it again sam.” On the other hand, arguably, to a person with at least some
background in encryption—such as a user of an Internet bulletin board in
which ROT13 is frequently employed—the number 13 itself could
communicate that a certain kind of encryption is being used.181
In this regard, a subtle but very important distinction must be drawn
between “language” and “information.” Language refers to the syntax
and grammar used to signify things or states of affairs. Philosophers have
long recognized that there is a basic distinction between a “sign”
(language) and something that is “signified” (information).182 As the
great philosopher and theologian Augustine of Hippo argued: “[A] sign
is something which, offering itself to the senses, conveys something other
to the intellect.”183 Information, in contrast, can be defined as the content
of states of affairs embodied in “well formed, meaningful and truthful
data.”184 That is, information is the content of states of affairs, which must
be expressed in language to be understood by humans.185 Information is
the actual content of that which is signified, and language is the means
by which signs pointing to the signified are constructed.
This dynamic raises interesting questions in metaphysics. Does the
thing signified by a sign possess an actual existence? Is “information” in
some sense a fundamental element of the cosmos, along with energy and
matter? In Platonic and other metaphysically realist philosophy, echoed
in the quote from Augustine above, there is an actual ideal realm to which
181. For a discussion of the use of ROT13 in early Internet Usenet groups see ROT13 on
Wikipedia. See ROT13, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROT13 (last visited Mar. 14,
2018).
182. See Medieval Semiotics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 1–2.1 (last edited
on May 11, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/semiotics-medieval/.
183. Id. at § 2.1 (quoting Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, II.1.) (emphasis added).
184. See Semantic Conceptions of Information, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
§ 3.2.3 (last edited on Jan. 7, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-semantic/.
185. See id.
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signs refer and which provides the universal “form” of particular things
in the world.186 Much contemporary semantic theory, including much of
the application of semantics to computer science and artificial
intelligence, assumes that the sign and the signified are closely related—
that, in some sense, the sign constructs the signified without any external
referent such as the Platonic realm of “forms” or the Augustinian mind
of God.187
Aside from these rich metaphysical questions, the close relation
between sign and signified in computer code means that code is
essentially arbitrary.188 But if computer code is arbitrary, how can we (or
the machine) know what is signified? As Kumiko Tanaka-Ishii notes,
“[o]ne of the basic ways is to take an operational approach and judge the
equivalence from input and output sets.”189 Since in computing terms
“output” is a function of the machine, we could say that computer code
is what it does. In this sense, computer code is not the message itself,
even though code does cause computer machines to output messages.
At the same time, since the code is not the message, code that outputs
a message can be disaggregated, compressed, or otherwise manipulated
without destroying the message. This remarkable fact underlies all
historic forms of cryptography as well as modern telecommunications
technology.190 A message in English—say, “Watson, come here, I need
you”—can be converted into an information equivalent, such as
electromagnetic waves or digital 0’s and 1’s, and this information
equivalent can be compressed, chopped up, and transmitted or stored. The
information equivalent can then be retrieved and run through a receiver
that reproduces the original language.191
When this happens, no new “information” is being created. The state
of affairs that the “information” encodes or that which is signified—the
fact that Edison desires Watson to come to the lab—remains the same. In
fact, modern information theory involves laws of the conservation of
information, akin to the laws of the conservation of matter in physics. The

186. See, e.g., KUMIKO TANAKA-ISHII, SEMIOTICS OF PROGRAMMING 54 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2010).
187. See id. The metaphysical belief that signs—“code”—construct reality is the instinct
behind most kinds of Internet exceptionalism. See David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing
Jefferson’s Candle: Towards a Critical Realist Approach to Cultural Environmentalism and
Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS 203, 210, 239 (2009).
188. See TANAKA-ISHII, supra note 186, at 67.
189. Id.
190. See Information, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, § 2.1, (Oct. 26, 2012),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information/.
191. See id.
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notion of signal “loss,” such as parts of a radio transmission or cell phone
call that “drop out,” relates to this conservation law.192
These semantic concepts from information theory do not sit entirely
comfortably with the “linguistic turn” in contemporary analytic
philosophy. The semantic concept of information assumes a sort of
metaphysic in which “information” comprises a fundamental reality. This
reflects the influence of logical positivism on early information theorists
and cyberneticists such as Claude Shannon and Norbert Weiner.193 The
problem of language, however, was a key reason for the collapse of
logical positivism.194 The “sign” rarely, if ever, corresponds directly to
the “signified” without context. For this reason, some philosophers of
language, particularly those attracted to “speech-act theory,” distinguish
the act of speaking (the “illocutionary act”) from the desired state of
affairs the speaker intends to produce (the “perlocutionary act”). The
focus shifts from the speech itself to action.195
The shift from speech to action has not been lost on legal theory,
particularly in relation to statutory interpretation. In his book Legal and
Political Hermeneutics, first published in 1837, Francis Lieber used the
example of a “housekeeper” who gives some money to a “domestic” and
tells the domestic to “fetch some soupmeat.”196 Lieber noted that this
simple, everyday command includes within it at least eight other unstated
commands (such as “fetch the meat for the use of the family and not for
himself”) that the domestic must incorporate into his interpretation of the
primary command based on context and experience.197
The act of providing the password and decryption key necessary to
unlock full disk encryption on a computer hard drive resides at the nexus
between the positivistic-cybernetic information theories that underlie
computer technology and the act-based theories of language that inform
contemporary debates in the philosophy of language. This is why the
problem in legal doctrine seems so vexing: is typing or speaking a
password, or triggering the application of a coded decryption key, a form
192. See Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM
TECH. J. 379, 379 (1948).
193. For a discussion of logical positivism, see THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY at 621–24 (Richard H. Popkin ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1999). For Weiner’s
germinal work, see NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS, OR THE CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN
THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (M.I.T. Press 2d ed. 1961). For a discussion of Weiner’s life, see
FLO CONWAY & JIM SIEGELMAN, DARK HERO OF THE INFORMATION AGE: IN SEARCH OF NORBERT
WIENER THE FATHER OF CYBERNETICS (Basic Books 2009).
194. See, e.g., THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 193, at 624.
195. See id.
196. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28 (F.H. Thomas 3d ed. 1880).
197. Id. at 28–29. This example is discussed in a collection of materials on statutory
interpretation in ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 694–95 (West 4th ed. 2007).
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of “speech” that could be testimonial and legally privileged, or is it a form
of “action,” like handing over a physical key, that in itself would not be
considered testimonial speech? In the distinction between “privacy” and
“testimony,” the courts must confront a basic, almost mystical question
at the intersection of semantic theory, philosophy of information, and
computer science.
Indeed, as the next two Sections suggest, this problem is not entirely
unique to the Fifth Amendment context—it is a basic problem for the law
in the information age. Courts have also wrestled with the question
whether certain kinds of performative acts or instructions, including the
operation of computer code, are protected under the First Amendment or
are subject to statutory copyright protection. The First Amendment and
copyright cases provide some additional context for our discussion of
whether forced decryption should be considered “testimonial” under the
Fifth Amendment.
C. “Speech” in the First Amendment Context
Not all conduct that arguably contains some expressive content is
considered protected “speech” under the First Amendment. In Spence v.
State of Washington,198 the Court addressed whether the modification
(with a peace symbol) and upside-down display of an American flag in
violation of a state flag desecration statute was a form of protected
speech.199 In concluding that this conduct was protected speech, the court
considered four factors: (1) whether the act is “sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication”; (2) whether the “context in which a symbol
is used . . . give[s] meaning to the symbol”; (3) whether “[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message” is present; and (4) whether “in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”200
As might be expected, slippery guidelines such as these have been
notoriously difficult to apply. For example, in City of Dallas v.
Stanglin,201 the Court considered whether a city ordinance that created
“teenage” dance halls limited to persons between the ages of 14 and 18
violated the expressional association rights of those persons to associate
with persons of other age groups. 202 The Court declined to extend First
Amendment protection to “recreational dancing.”203 According to Justice
Rehnquist, “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 409–11.
490 U.S. 19 (1989).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 25.
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every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street
or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.”204
The nexus between an ordinary function not considered “speech,”
such as walking to a shopping mall, and protected expression is
particularly interesting in the context of computer code. The Supreme
Court has never decided whether, or to what extent, computer code is a
form of “speech” protected by the First Amendment, although some
important federal appellate cases hold that computer code is a form of
protected speech.
In Junger v. Daley,205 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that export
control restrictions on encryption software potentially could violate the
First Amendment.206 The court did not decide the merits, however,
because the restrictions changed while the case was pending.207 And in
Universal City Studios v. Corley,208 an important early case challenging
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, the Second Circuit held that computer code is a form of protected
speech.209 According to the Second Circuit, “[c]ommunication does not
lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is expressed
in the language of computer code.”210 The court noted that “[i]f someone
chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code by using strings
of 1’s and 0’s for each letter of each word, the resulting work would be
no different for constitutional purposes than if it had been written in
English.”211
The categories of being a “witness” against oneself under the Fifth
Amendment and “speech” under the First Amendment obviously are not
coextensive. Many “speech” acts for First Amendment purposes would
not entail being a “witness” against one’s self (or, in the language of the
modern case law, would not be “testimonial”). But if the relevant analogy
is the lockbox key versus the lockbox combination, Junger and Corley
seem potentially relevant. If computer code is merely functional and not
expressive, it seems more like the lockbox key, whereas if computer code
is expressive, it seems more like the combination.
204. Id.
205. 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
206. Id. at 482.
207. Id. at 485.
208. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
209. Id. at 449.
210. Id. at 445.
211. Id. at 445–46. For further discussion of the relationship between source code, speech,
and encryption, see Allen Cook Barr, Note, Guardians of Your Galaxy S7: Encryption Backdoors
and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 301 (2016).
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D. “Expression” in Copyright Law
Copyright law is another analogous area for our discussion of speech,
testimony, and computer code. Copyright protects original works that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.212 U.S. copyright law has long
recognized that computer code, including both human-readable source
code and machine-readable object code, are “literary works” subject to
copyright protection.213 However, copyright extends only to original
expression and not to any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”214 The function of a
computer program therefore is not susceptible to copyright protection.
The copyrightability of object code is particularly interesting for
purposes of this Article. Computers operate using a binary language of
0’s and 1’s, called object code.215 The 0’s and 1’s represent states in a
circuit: 0 is “off” and 1 is “on.”216 Human beings generally cannot write
or interpret object code.217 Instead, human programmers employ a coding
language, which produces source code. For example, some lines of source
code instructing the system to produce a printout when the user responds
affirmatively to a query might read:
<display>“Do you wish to print”
If <input> = “yes” then <print>
A program called a “complier” would translate this source code into
object code, a sequence of 0’s and 1’s that would cause the computer to
perform the specified functions.218
If object code is compiled by computers and is not readable by
humans, how can it comprise copyrightable subject matter? An early case
involving player-pianos, White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co.,219 laid the foundation for later doctrine.220 The issue in White-Smith
212. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
213. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1, 16 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report]; Apple Comput., Inc. v.
Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247–49 (3d Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, as recognized in Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
214. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
215. See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1243.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. This description still generally holds for many kinds of programming, but as
discussed below, it can be misleading in modern programming environments.
219. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
220. See generally id. at 1, superseded by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012), as recognized
in Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1240.
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was whether a player-piano roll was an infringing “copy” of the protected
musical score.221 Player-pianos employed cylinders of paper with
perforations that caused the device’s internal levers to play certain
notes.222 The master “recording” of perforations was created when a
person played the notes on a piano rigged to make the corresponding
perforations in a blank roll.223 Human beings generally could not “write”
or read these perforations.224
In White-Smith, Justice Day held that the rolls were not infringing
“copies” under the 1907 Copyright Act.225 In a concurrence, Justice
Holmes questioned why a machine-readable reproduction should not be
considered a “copy,” but agreed that the question should be addressed to
the legislature.226 The significance of the case for contemporary copyright
doctrine is that the 1909 Copyright Act clarified that “mechanical
reproductions” of music are protected “copies.” Then, the 1976
Copyright Act further clarified that a “copy” can include any “material
object . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.” Finally, the 1980 amendment based
on the CONTU Report included computer programs within the definition
of “copy.”227
For copyright purposes, then, human expression that is rendered by
machines into a format readable only by machines remains protectable
expression both in its human-readable and machine-only-readable form.
This seems to extend the First Amendment principles regarding computer
software discussed in Section III.B above. Even when there is an
intermediate step of machine “translation,” the resulting information can
be considered “expression,” at least for the purpose of copyright law. By
analogy, using a password to unlock a decryption key so that a disk’s
contents can be human-readable might represent a form of “testimonial”
speech even though the mechanical process of “translation”—
decryption—happens within the machine.
An interesting wrinkle in the copyright discussion of computer code
is that the early cases describing how programming works—from source
221. Id. at 13–14.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 10.
224. See id. at 9–10, 18 (noting that the perforated musical rolls used by player pianos are
created via “mechanical construction,” and that such rolls cannot be read as musical
compositions).
225. Id. at 18.
226. Id. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copy” and “computer program”); Copyright Act of
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075–76 (1909) (extending Copyright protection to
“mechanical reproductions” of music).
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code, to a complier, to object code—are no longer entirely accurate.228
For some kinds of coding languages, the source code is not usually
compiled into object code, but instead is executed by an “interpreter.”229
A common example is JavaScript, which is employed on many webpages
and is interpreted and run by web browsers.230 Also, some programming
environments, such as Microsoft Visual Basic, enable programmers to
select and assemble pre-coded modules through a graphical user interface
(GUI) instead of writing lines of source code.231 In these kinds of
environments, there is perhaps an even closer link between the humanreadable and machine-readable iterations of the work.
IV. ENCRYPTION, THE SIGN, AND THE SIGNIFIED: WHY DISCLOSURE OF
PASSWORDS OR DECRYPTION KEYS IS NOT TESTIMONIAL
These analogies from First Amendment and copyright law highlight
the difficulty of classifying computer code in semiotic terms. In these
domains, computer code can be a form of protected expression because it
is a kind of language. Like any other language, computer code is viewed
in First Amendment and copyright law through a somewhat naïve
semiotic lens as a kind of sign that points relatively straightforwardly to
some intelligible human signification. But the more computer code
moves towards basic functionality, the less likely it is to be protected by
law.
In this light, the apparent relevance of First Amendment cases, such
as Junger and Corley, to the Fifth Amendment context dims.232 In those
cases, the speaker of computer code is the person who writes the code.233
An end user of encryption software does not write any code. The
password that unlocks a device using full disk encryption is not itself
computer code, but triggers the application of computer code when the
decryption key is applied to the encrypted data in relation to the
encryption algorithm.

228. See Ed Felten, Source Code and Object Code, PRINCETON CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. POL’Y:
FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 4, 2002), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2002/09/04/source-code-andobject-code/.
229. Id.
230. See Overview of JavaScript, http://web.stanford.edu/class/cs98si/slides/overview.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
231. See Margaret Rouse, Visual Basic (VB), TECHTARGET http://searchwindevelopment.
techtarget.com/definition/Visual-Basic (last visited Feb. 27, 2018); Derek Banas, Visual Basic
Tutorial 2017, YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3FkWddODLno.
232. See supra Section III.C.
233. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2001);
Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2000).
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Similarly, copyright protects only original expression, not ideas,
processes, methods, or systems of operation.234 This makes the issue of
infringement interesting in computer software copyright cases. By
definition, computer programs are designed to cause computers to
perform some function. What aspect of computer code could be
“expression” rather than an idea, process, method, or system of
operation? In an infringement claim involving computer software, the
court usually will seek to define various levels of “abstraction,” from
lines of code to structure and logic to general function, in order to filter
out elements that are unprotectable before comparing the protectable
elements with the allegedly infringing program.235 As may be imagined,
this is at best an imprecise exercise.
It is unlikely that an encryption key, algorithm, or related password
could be considered protectable “expression” under any kind of
abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis. The algorithm is a
mathematical function, which can only be expressed in a particular way,
and therefore is equivalent to the idea itself and is unprotectable under
the “merger” doctrine.236 The form of the key is dictated by the function
of the algorithm.
Things get interesting here, because a strong encryption algorithm
must be capable of generating very large numbers of unique keys;
otherwise, any given collection of encrypted data would be subject to
brute force attack employing a defined set of keys. It is possible that, with
a large number of possible variations, the merger doctrine might not
eliminate copyright entirely. It is doubtful, however, that any person
could be considered the “author” of a randomly generated key for
copyright purposes.
Like the First Amendment analogy, the copyright analogy
demonstrates the difficulty of determining what kind of communication
inheres in computer code, and more particularly, in encryption
algorithms, keys, and associated passwords. As with the First
Amendment analysis, the immediate functionality of this form of
expression suggests that it would not be legally protected under copyright
law. The random nature of machine-generated keys further argues against
copyrightability. There is an undefined point at which computer code is
no longer a sign that points to something signified, similar to language or
“speech,” but instead is a kind of “thing” in itself, similar to a tool, device,
or key.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
235. See, e.g., Comput. Assoc’s Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
236. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
“expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the
idea itself”).
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This demonstrates that disclosure of an encryption algorithm or
decryption key itself should not be viewed as testimonial “speech” under
the Fifth Amendment. In semantic terms, handing over passwords and
decryption keys is like handing over a physical key, even though speaking
or typing a code accomplishes the act of “handing over.” If the content of
some computer code could itself convey a message that might incriminate
a person, the Fifth Amendment privilege should apply. But this is
unlikely and does not apply at all to encryption algorithms or decryption
keys. This kind of code does not convey any message. It has no semantic
content and is entirely functional. The forced disclosure of a decryption
key, then, should not in itself implicate the Fifth Amendment.
But what about the forced disclosure of a biometric identifier or
password that is tied to full disk encryption? Biometric identifiers such
as fingerprints seem closest to the kinds of acts of production the Fisher
Court said are not testimonial, including “traditional” blood samples.237
Passwords seem different because they are “words,” or at least strings of
characters. As with fingerprints, however, the pass-“words” or character
strings tied to full disk encryption convey no semantic content. They are
entirely functional. Disclosing the password is very much like the
physical act of handing over the lockbox key; the decryption key is very
much like the teeth on the lockbox key, which fit into the mechanical
locking mechanism, and the encryption algorithm is very much like the
mechanical locking mechanism on the strongbox lock.
This semantic analysis suggests that the “foregone conclusion”
doctrine should be viewed in this context not as an “exception” to the
Fifth Amendment privilege, but as a tool that helps clarify what kinds of
technological acts fall on the side of “function” rather than “testimonial
communication.” The cases that have ordered disclosure of passwords or
encryption keys have found or assumed the action was testimonial but
applied the foregone conclusion doctrine as an exception.238 The results
in those cases were correct, but a more careful review of how passwords
and biometric identifiers function in relation to encryption could
strengthen the analysis.
In a few cases, courts have refused to apply the foregone conclusion
doctrine to forced decryption based on the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning
in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011.239 Other courts
should reject the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning because, as the discussion
of full disk encryption in Part I above demonstrates, that court made a
fundamental mistake concerning the nature of encrypted computer
237. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
238. See supra Section II.B.
239. See, e.g., SEC v. Huang, No. 15-269, 2015 WL 5611644, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23,
2015) (relying on In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 2012) in declining to apply the foregone conclusion doctrine).
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“files.” The Eleventh Circuit panel’s failure to understand basic computer
technology fatally undermines its legal analysis of both the nontestimonial nature of computer encryption keys or passwords and the
“foregone conclusion” rule.
The Eleventh Circuit seemed to suggest that a computer “file” must
contain semantically meaningful information—that the 0’s and 1’s must
signify some meaningful concept.240 A “file,” however, is not a
component of a “language.” A file is merely a kind of container, which
may or may not hold documents encoded with some semantic meaning,
and a computer “file” is simply any specific set of data stored on a
computer.241 Therefore, the “random characters” placed on the hard drive
by the TrueCrypt software were computer “files,” contrary to the court’s
conclusion. Production of the encryption key or password would merely
have allowed the government to decrypt those files that were more than
random strings of characters, or at least to determine that none of the
computer files contained meaningful information.242
The Eleventh Circuit’s misunderstanding of computer technology was
compounded by its misplaced reliance on Justice Stevens’ opinion in
Hubbell.243 Justice Stevens’ concern in Hubbell related to the requirement
that the defendant comb through large numbers of documents and identify
specific documents that might respond to the subpoena, when the
government had no prior reason to believe that the documents might exist
or be under the defendant’s control.244 In forced decryption cases, in
contrast, the government already knows the hard drive or other computer
storage device exists and is under the suspect’s control; that the hard drive
or storage device is encrypted; and that the suspect possesses the
password or key necessary for decryption. If the underlying concern is
that the search warrant, subpoena, or other process used to obtain the hard
drive or storage device was overly broad, that issue properly falls under
240. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d. at 1346.
241. See File, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/file (“c (1) : a collection of related data records (as for a computer) (2) : a complete
collection of data (such as text or a program) treated by a computer as a unit especially for
purposes of input and output”); File, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/file (“1.2 Computing A collection of data, programs, etc. stored in a computer’s
memory or on a storage device under a single identifying name”); File, FREE DICTIONARY,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/file (“3. a collection of related computer data or program
records stored by name”).
242. See Dan Terzian, Forced Decryption as a Foregone Conclusion, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR.
27, 35 (2015) (noting that “contrary to [the Eleventh Circuit’s] conclusion, the government always
knows that an encrypted hard drive has unencrypted files”).
243. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011, 670 F.3d at 1342,
1347.
244. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000).
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the Fourth Amendment privacy domain. Disclosure of the password or
decryption key only reveals facts about the suspect’s control over those
functional items, not about what the encrypted storage media does or does
not contain.
Consider the following example: a suspect in a tax fraud case admits
that an unlocked filing cabinet in his office contains “files” that belong to
him. The government obtains a grand jury subpoena requiring the suspect
to turn over the file cabinet. The suspect argues that he should not be
required to turn over the filing cabinet because this would comprise a
testimonial admission concerning his control over the documents in the
files. Under Fisher, this scenario clearly falls under the foregone
conclusion exception.245
But what if the suspect argues that he should not be required to turn
over the filing cabinet because all the files are empty—they are nothing
but manila folders that contain no writing and no documents of any kind?
This should utterly undermine, not support, any Fifth Amendment
argument. If the defendant’s argument is truthful, he would be required
to hand over some physical objects—a filing cabinet and some manila
folders. Production of these physical items would not be considered
testimonial under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and the suspect’s
possession and control of the items would be a foregone conclusion. The
suspect might have an objection to the subpoena based on scope, burden,
or relevance, but these are not Fifth Amendment privileges.
Assume further that the government believes the suspect is lying about
the folders being empty. The government believes, correctly, that the
folders contain records relating to the alleged tax fraud. Should the
subpoena be quashed because both the existence and content of the
documents could be incriminating given the suspect’s lie about the file
cabinet’s contents? This would be an obviously incorrect, indeed bizarre,
result. In response to a subpoena to produce files, a suspect would only
need to claim the files are “empty” to be relieved of any obligation of
production. The foregone conclusion exception would be gutted if it
could be avoided through a simple lie.
Imagine instead that the suspect produces the physical file cabinet,
which is filled with manila folders containing sheets of paper covered
with seemingly random characters. The suspect admits that he employs a
crude encryption system that uses a cardboard “mask” with cut outs in a
pattern. When placed over the pages filled with seemingly random
character strings, the mask will reveal only the letters intended to be read
as part of a message. But the suspect claims that some or all of the files
in this cabinet really contain only random characters, without any
messages that could be revealed by the mask. In fact, this is part of the
245. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407–08 (1976).
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genius of his filing system, because an unwanted inquirer would need to
expend an enormous amount of time trying to discover which, if any, of
the files contain pages with messages. It seems clear that the foregone
conclusion doctrine would apply under these circumstances. There is no
doubt that the file cabinet exists, that it contains files, that the files contain
documents that may or may not convey meaningful semantic content, and
that all of this is under the custody and control of the suspect. Turning
over the files is an act of production, not of testimony.
In the example that opened this string of hypotheticals, we specified
that the suspect’s file cabinet was unlocked. If the cabinet was locked,
should that change the analysis of any of the hypotheticals under the
foregone conclusion exception? In addition to the cabinet itself, the
government must obtain the physical key or lock combination (depending
on the kind of lock) from the suspect. The issue here is not what, if
anything, the file cabinet contains, but rather whether the suspect
possesses or knows the key or combination. Since the suspect admitted
that he uses the cabinet to store “files,” regardless of what those “files”
might contain, the suspect’s possession and control of the key or
combination is a foregone conclusion. This suggests that the Third
Circuit’s comment in Apple Macpro Computer was apt: the relevant
testimony would be “‘I, John Doe, [have the key or] know the
[combination] for [this filing cabinet].’”246 Even more directly, if the
suspect turned over the key or combination, this would comprise an act
of surrender, not of testimony. Although both the teeth on the key and the
characters in the combination function as types of code, neither are signs
that signify any meaning beyond their function. The same is true of
passwords and biometric identifiers that access decryption keys.
CONCLUSION
Encryption is an ancient technology that has become widely available
and enormously powerful in the computer age. It is both necessary to
contemporary life and dangerous. While encryption enables free
commerce and free speech, it also allows criminals an uncrackable safe
haven—a kind of digital Tortuga for online piracy.247 Courts now
regularly must decide whether compelled disclosure of passwords or
decryption keys violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Neither a password, nor a biometric identifier that
activates a decryption algorithm, nor the algorithm itself, comprises
testimonial speech. Handing over a password, biometric identifier, or
decryption key is akin to handing over a physical key, which is not
246. United States v. Apple Macpro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 248 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017).
247. Tortuga is a Caribbean Island made famous as a pirate stronghold in the Pirates of the
Caribbean movies. See Tortuga, FANDOM: POTC WIKI, http://pirates.wikia.com/wiki/Tortuga (last
visited Mar. 12, 2018).
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ordinarily a testimonial act under the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence. The foregone conclusion doctrine should be employed in
these cases not as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege, but to
clarify that compelled decryption is an act of production and not a
testimonial act. Courts that have held otherwise have not properly
understood what encryption is or what it does.
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